Maldives Monetary Authority · statistics database
The economy as the
central bank measures it.
The Monetary Authority publishes 4,671 series covering the real, fiscal, financial and external sectors. These are the key indicators — money, reserves, rates, debt and the external balance — read straight from its API and refreshed whenever a series is revised.
Nineteen indicators, one screen
Everything the Monetary Authority tracks most closely, at its latest published reading. Select any row to trace it back through its history.
| Indicator | Period | Latest | vs previous | vs year ago |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growthAnnual | 2025 | 6.16% | +2.67 | +2.67 |
| Inflation, nationalMonthly | Jun 2026 | 2.56% | +0.02 | -1.45 |
| Tourist arrivalsMonthly | Jul 2026 | 183,119 | +59567.00 | -3619.00 |
| Official reserve assetsMonthly | Jul 2026 | 638.0 | -48.80 | -136.48 |
| MVR per USDMonthly | Jul 2026 | 15.42 | 0.00 | +0.00 |
| Broad money (M2)Monthly | Jul 2026 | 79,222.2 | +561.91 | +14898.37 |
| Claims on private sectorMonthly | Jul 2026 | 41,970.1 | +809.35 | +5895.04 |
| Treasury bill, 3 monthMonthly | Jul 2026 | 3.87% | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Treasury bill, 6 monthMonthly | Jul 2026 | 4.23% | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Treasury bill, 12 monthMonthly | Jul 2026 | 4.60% | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Overall balanceMonthly | Jul 2026 | 400.7 | +1499.53 | +210.08 |
| Primary balanceMonthly | Jul 2026 | 627.5 | +1317.67 | +36.95 |
| Total debtQuarterly | Q2 2026 | 122.75% | -1.80 | -2.25 |
| Domestic debtQuarterly | Q2 2026 | 78.22% | +4.08 | +5.59 |
| External debtQuarterly | Q2 2026 | 44.53% | -5.88 | -7.84 |
| Current account balanceAnnual | 2025 | -476.2 | +777.45 | +777.45 |
| Current account, % of GDPAnnual | 2025 | -6.16% | +11.63 | +11.63 |
| Foreign currency reservesMonthly | Jul 2026 | 622.8 | -48.91 | -144.55 |
| Tourist arrivals, dailyDaily | 31 Jul 2026 | 5,523 | -533.00 | -777.00 |
Official reserve assets
External Sector › Reserve Data Template · US$ mn
Source: Maldives Monetary Authority · updated 2026-08-09 17:10:00
What the country holds in foreign currency
Official reserve assets are the buffer behind a pegged currency: they pay for imports and defend the rate. The rufiyaa has been held in a narrow band against the dollar throughout, which is why the reserve line moves and the exchange-rate line does not.
-136.5m on a year earlier
end of period
the usable portion
reached Mar 2026
Official reserve assets
Millions of US dollars, monthly. The series runs back to 1986; the last fifteen years are shown.
Rufiyaa per US dollar
End-of-period rate. A separate chart rather than a second axis: reserves are in dollars and the rate is a ratio, so they do not share a scale.
What the banking system holds and lends
Broad money is every rufiyaa the public can spend; claims on the private sector are what the banks have lent out against it. Treasury bill rates are the price the government pays to borrow at home.
MVR 79,222.2 million
53% of broad money
weighted average rate
weighted average rate
Broad money and private credit
Millions of rufiyaa. Both are stocks measured at month end, so they share a scale and belong on one chart.
Treasury bill rates
Weighted average rates by maturity. Longer paper pays more — the gap between the three lines is the term premium.
Debt at 123% of GDP
The monthly balance is what the government collected less what it spent; the debt stock is what those deficits have accumulated into. Public and publicly guaranteed debt passed the size of the economy itself.
public and publicly guaranteed, % of GDP
owed at home, % of GDP
owed abroad, % of GDP
MVR -5,982.4 million
Monthly fiscal balance
Revenue and grants less total expenditure, millions of rufiyaa. Latest: Jul 2026 at 400.7.
Public and publicly guaranteed debt
Percent of GDP, quarterly, split by where it is owed. Domestic and external stack to the total.
When the debt moved, and who was in office
Bands mark presidential terms; the marker sits on the quarter each president took office. Which measure you pick changes the story, so all three are here — a share of GDP, a cash amount, and the external stock that is the only series long enough to span every administration.
Total debt · % of GDP
Public and publicly guaranteed debt as a share of the economy. Quarterly, and only from 2015 — the series does not reach earlier administrations.
| President | In office | At start | At end | Change | Change % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
 Abdulla Yameen | 2013-11 → 2018-11before the data | 51.5%Q1 2015 | 72.4%Q4 2018 | +20.9 | +40.6% |
 Ibrahim Mohamed Solih | 2018-11 → 2023-11 | 72.4%Q4 2018 | 123.6%Q4 2023 | +51.2 | +70.7% |
 Mohamed Muizzu | 2023-11 → present | 123.6%Q4 2023 | 122.8%Q2 2026 | -0.9 | -0.7% |
Start and end are the nearest published quarter to each inauguration, so a term that began mid-quarter is measured from the quarter end. Where a presidency began before the series does, the first available reading is used and the row is marked.
Why the ratio moved: borrowing, or the economy underneath it
Each year's change in debt as a share of GDP, split into the part explained by new borrowing and the part explained by nominal GDP growing or shrinking. The two sum exactly to the change — this is arithmetic, not a model.
Read 2020 as the clearest case: the ratio jumped mainly because the denominator collapsed, not only because the state borrowed more. The exchange rate contributes nothing to any of these bars — the rufiyaa is pegged, so external debt is not revalued from one year to the next.
Three measures, three different stories
As a share of GDP, debt looks violent in 2020 and calmer since. As a cash amount it rises almost monotonically. The external stock in dollars is the only one long enough to compare five presidencies. None is more correct than the others — a ratio answers "can it be carried?", a level answers "how much is owed?" — so the toggle exists rather than a single headline.
A ratio has two moving parts
Debt to GDP can rise without a single extra rufiyaa being borrowed, if the economy shrinks. That is exactly what 2020 was: output fell about a third and the ratio went from 77% to 152% inside a year, then fell back to 112% as tourism returned. The decomposition above separates the two so the borrowing is not credited with the whole move.
The peg removes a usual suspect
In many countries a currency slide inflates external debt overnight. Not here: since 2015 the rufiyaa has stayed between 15.35 and 15.42 to the dollar, so the external stock converts at essentially the same rate every year and contributes almost nothing to the changes shown. What moves these numbers is borrowing and growth, not valuation.
What the series cannot reach
The headline public and publicly guaranteed measure begins in 2015, so it cannot say anything about the Nasheed or Waheed years, and covers only the tail of Yameen's. That is a gap in the published record, not an omission here — switch to the external measure for the longer view, remembering it is a narrower definition that excludes domestic debt.
Timing is not responsibility
Loans are disbursed years after they are signed, infrastructure is paid for across terms, and guarantees on state-enterprise borrowing sit outside the annual budget. A term band shows when the stock moved relative to who held office. Establishing who decided what would need the loan agreements and budget documents, which are not in this dataset.
Where the figures end
Debt is published quarterly and runs to Q2 2026. The decomposition needs annual nominal GDP, which is an outturn only through 2025, so it ends at 2025 rather than borrowing from a forecast. Both refresh automatically when MMA revises them.
Exim Bank - China lent the most; India gave the most
The debt figures above say how much is owed. The Ministry of Finance also publishes who it is owed to. Between 2012 and 2021, foreign loan disbursements totalled MVR 32,772 million and grants MVR 5,893 million — with Exim Bank - China the largest single lender and India by far the largest source of grants.
disbursed 2012–2021
grants over the same period
MVR 6,407m against MVR 590m
recorded as “others”, bonds or domestic sources
Foreign loan disbursements by lender, 2012–2021
Every lending agency the Ministry of Finance names, totalled across the years it reports as outturns. The bars in grey are not agencies: “others” is an unattributed residual and the largest single line in the table, “foreign bond” is market borrowing, and “domestic sources” is not foreign at all. They are shown rather than quietly dropped, because leaving them out would make the named list look complete when 57% of the money is not attributed to anyone.
The five biggest lenders, year by year
Named counterparties only. Lending arrives in lumps rather than a steady flow — a single project loan drawing down can dominate a year — so the totals on the left are the fairer comparison and this shows when the money actually moved.
Three limits, and they matter more here than on most charts. The workbook is titled 2012–2025, but only the years through 2021 are outturns — the rest are revised or approved budget figures, and none of them are shown above. These are disbursements, the money drawn down in a year, not the stock of debt outstanding: a loan signed years ago and still being repaid does not appear, so this answers “who has been putting money in” rather than “who is owed what today”. And 57% of loan disbursements sit under “others”, bonds or domestic sources rather than a named lender, which is enough to change the ranking if it were ever broken out. Source: Ministry of Finance, Government Finance Statistics.